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Whereas previous findings suggest that mood alters information process-
ing style judgment and strategic behavior, in the present article, the hy-
pothesis is tested that moods influence our non–conscious behavior. In the
first study, we observed a correlation between participants’ mood and their
non–conscious mimicry of a person on television. In the second study, par-
ticipants were put in either a positive or negative mood and afterwards they
watched a video comprising of two episodes, one with a pen–playing ex-
perimenter, and one with a non-pen–playing experimenter. Participants
were videotaped to see whether they would mimic the pen–playing exper-
imenter. As predicted, we found that only participants in a positive mood
mimic the confederate’s behavior. Finally, tentative evidence suggesting
that the effect of mood on mimicry is mediated by cognitive processing
style is discussed. These results support a functional explanation for the
effects of mood on information processing and behavior.
Mood has a profound effect on information processing and judge-
ments. When we are in a positive mood, we tend to rely on exist-
ing knowledge structures, such as stereotypes (Bodenhausen,
426
Social Cognition, Vol. 24, No. 4, 2006, pp. 426-437
Address correspondence to Rick van Baaren, Department of Social Psychology, Univer-
sity of Nijmegen, PO Box 9104, 6500 HE Nijmegen, The Netherlands; E–mail:
r.vanbaaren@psych.ru.nl.
Kramer, & Süsser, 1994) and scripts (Bless, Clore, Schwarz,
Golisano, Rabe, & Wolk, 1996) to a greater extent than when we
are in a negative mood. Although there are several competing ac-
counts for the effects of mood on processing (see Forgas, 2002, for
a review), a functional explanation for these findings is suggested
by Schwarz and colleagues (Clore, Gasper, & Garvin, 2001;
Schwarz, 1990; Schwarz & Bohner, 1996; Schwarz & Clore, 1996).
In this explanation, moods (or diffuse affective states) serve as a
signal, conveying information about the friendliness of our envi-
ronment. This explanation is based on Jackobsen’s (1957) view of
mood as a “barometer.” A positive mood signals that the environ-
ment is safe and unproblematic, whereas a negative mood indi-
cates potential problems. These signals subsequently influence
our information processing and judgements. When we are in a
positive mood, our environment seems to pose no threat and we
are more likely to rely on heuristic (Bless et al., 1996;
Bodenhausen, Kramer, & ,Süsser 1994) and creative processing
(Bless, Bohner, Schwarz, & Strack, 1990; Bodenhausen et al.,
1994). In contrast, a negative mood signals that the environment
is problematic and that therefore one needs to be on guard, result-
ing in an information processing style that is relatively analytical,
effortful, and cautious (Bless, Mackie, & Schwarz, 1992;
Bodenhausen et al., 1994; Schwarz & Bless, 1991; Schwarz &
Clore, 1996). In sum, a positive mood elicits a more holistic and
less analytic way of perceiving and processing information about
the environment than a negative mood.
Furthermore, research has shown that moods not only influ-
ence our information processing, but also our strategic behavior
(see Forgas, 2002). As Forgas describes:
Affective states influence interpersonal behaviors because of their influ-
ence on individual cognitive processes. In several experiments we dem-
onstrated that mild mood states influence the way people think about,
plan, and execute strategic interactions, the way they formulate and re-
spond to requests, and the way they perform in bargaining tasks.
(Forgas, 2002, p. 94)
Something is missing, however. The functional explanation of
mood effects can hardly be called functional when it depends on
conscious cognitive effort, or when it only influences conscious
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and strategic behaviors. For moods to be truly functional, given
the extremely complex environment we live in and interact with,
they should (a) be capable of non–conscious activation and (b) in-
fluence our implicit cognitions and implicit or non–conscious be-
havior. Evidence for the hypothesis that moods can be
non–consciously influenced comes from recent work by
Chartrand, Van Baaren, and Bargh (in press), which indicates
that subliminal exposure to either positive or negative words in-
duces corresponding mood states and information processing
style, that is, better moods and more heuristic processing after
subliminal exposure to positively valanced words compared to
negatively valanced words. These results suggest that our moods
do automatically inform us about the status of our environment.
For this to be functional, however, moods should also influence
our automatic behavior.
In this article, we propose that mood affects our non–conscious
behavior. As argued above, in a negative mood, people process
information more effortful and tend to be more analytic, whereas
a positive mood is associated with less effortfully and hence,
more automatic, processes. By the same token, a negative mood
should induce cautious behaviors, that is, to “think before one
acts,” while a positive mood may facilitate spontaneous, auto-
matic behavioral tendencies, that is, “to act on impulse.” From the
same general functional perspective, then, it can be argued that
mood will also affect non–conscious behavior. Specifically, it is
hypothesized that in a positive mood, people will more easily
adopt automatic behaviors than in a negative mood.
One of the purest forms of automatic behavior is mimicry
(Chartrand & Bargh, 1999; Van Baaren, Horgan, Chartrand, &
Dijkmans, 2004; Van Baaren, Maddux, Chartrand, De Bouter, &
Van Knippenberg, 2003). Recent research by Chartrand and
Bargh (1999) convincingly showed that mimicry occurs automati-
cally and even among strangers. In this research, participants in-
teracted with an unknown confederate in two consecutive
picture–describing sessions. In one session, the confederate either
rubbed her face or shook her foot while describing the pictures
with the participants, while the second confederate performed
the behavior that the first confederate did not. The behavior of the
participants, recorded on videotape, showed that participants
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shook their foot more in the presence of the foot–shaking confed-
erate, and rubbed their faces more in the presence of the face–rub-
bing confederate. Debriefing indicated that participants were
unaware of their mimicry.
In the present research, we assessed the effect of mood on
non–conscious mimicry. In Study 1, we focused on the correlation
between naturally occurring differences in mood states and
non–conscious mimicry. In Study 2 the influence of mood on
non–conscious mimicry was studied using an experimental
manipulation of mood.
STUDY 1
METHOD
Participants. Fifty–eight undergraduate female students from the
University of Nijmegen were paid for participation in this study.
Procedure. Participants first filled out a questionnaire including a
mood adjective list. This list consisted of three items on bipolar
7–point scales, asking for the extent that participants felt good–bad,
happy–sad, and joyful–gloomy (alpha = .76). Afterwards, the experi-
menter instructed the participants to watch a 5–minute video, show-
ing an actor conducting a series of clerical tasks (e.g., making a
telephone call, writing in a diary, see Van Baaren et al., 2004, Study
1). In addition to these tasks, the actor also rubbed his face several
times (e.g., Chartrand & Bargh, 1999). No other behaviors than the
clerical tasks and the face rubbing were shown. When the experi-
menter had started the video she left the room, leaving the partici-
pant alone. The behavior of the participants was secretly observed
by a camera. The number of times that the participant rubbed his
face as well as the amount of time that each participant rubbed her
face was secretly observed by a camera and served as our measure
for mimicry. Finally, participants were thanked, debriefed, and
dismissed.
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
The face rubbing on the videotapes was coded by a judge and 10
participants were randomly checked by a second, independent
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judge. The data from the first participant was judged by both
judges, so they would agree on the criteria. The interjudge reli-
ability was very high, both for the number of times the participant
rubbed her face r(9) = .97, as for the amount of time she rubbed her
face, r(9) = .99.
A positive correlation was found between mood and the number
of times that the participant rubbed her face, r(55) = .26, p = .05, as
well as a positive correlation between mood and the amount of
time that the participant rubbed her face, r(55) = .28, p < .05.1 These
results are consistent with our general prediction: the more posi-
tive an individual’s mood state, the more this individual mimics
the behavior of the person on the television.
Because of the correlational nature of our first study, we decided
to run a second study. In Study 2, we investigated the effects of
mood on non–conscious mimicry, by using an experimental ma-
nipulation of mood.
STUDY 2
METHOD
Overview. Participants first watched a movie clip that either in-
duced a positive or a negative mood. Then they watched a video,
which consisted of two sessions. In one session an experimenter
either played or did not play with a pen, in the other session an-
other experimenter did the opposite. Participants were secretly
videotaped to test whether they mimicked the pen–playing be-
havior displayed on the TV screen.
Participants and Design. Thirty–five undergraduate students (8
male and 27 female) from the University of Nijmegen were paid
for participation in this study. The experiment had a 2 (Mood:
positive or negative) × 2 (Behavior: pen–playing or control) mixed
design with repeated measure on the second factor.
Procedure. Upon arrival at the laboratory the participant was led
into the experimental room, where the experimenter then ex-
plained that the participant would have to perform several unre-
lated tasks, and turned on the video for the first task.
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1. Three participants had mood scores that deviated more than 2.5 SD from the mean
and were therefore excluded from the analysis.
The first task was the mood induction. In both conditions partic-
ipants watched a film clip of approximately 6 minutes. In the posi-
tive condition the clip was a compilation of Mr. Bean sketches, a
funny TV show, whereas in the negative condition, the film clip
was a scene from Sophie’s Choice. In a pilot study, these clips were
successful in inducing the corresponding moods. Thirty–three
participants watched either Mr. Bean or Sophie’s Choice and imme-
diately thereafter their moods were assessed. The mood measure-
ment consisted of two bipolar 7–point scales (α = .89), with each
scale–end corresponding to a specific feeling (good–bad,
happy–sad). Results indicated that participants who watched
Sophie’s Choice were in a negative mood (M = 3.11), and partici-
pants who watched Mr. Bean were in a positive mood (M = 5.70),
t(1, 31) = –8.14, p < .001.
After this mood induction, the experimenter reentered the room
and started the second videotape. The participant was told that this
was a new and unrelated study on music and preferences. On this
tape a “music task” was presented, in which participants had to lis-
ten to pieces of music that an experimenter on the TV screen osten-
sibly started. The task consisted of two sessions. Within each
session two music fragments of two- and-a- half minutes were
played. Two experimenters were used and each experimenter ap-
peared in one session of the videotape. In one session the experi-
menter would play with a pen, in the other session the
experimenter would not play with a pen. It’s important to note that
participants were alone in the room and the actor/experimenter
appeared on the TV screen. The pen playing occurred three times a
minute for 10 seconds and in the control session, no pen playing oc-
curred at all. Participants were videotaped to see whether they imi-
tated the pen–playing behavior of the experimenter on the TV
screen. Experimenters and behaviors were counterbalanced.
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
Non–Conscious Behavior Measure: Mimicry.2 The interjudge relia-
bilities for pen–playing was satisfactory, r = .69. No effects of coun-
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2. Two participants had mimicry scores that deviated more than 2.5 SD from the mean
and were therefore excluded from the analysis.
terbalancing were observed (all F’s < 1), so the data were collapsed.
The number of times the participants played with a pen was sub-
jected to a 2 (mood: positive or negative) × 2 (behavior: pen playing
or control) mixed model analysis of variance (ANOVA) with re-
peated measures on the second factor. The only significant effect
was the expected mood × behavior interaction, F(1, 31) = 6.29, p <
.02. Simple effect analyses confirmed that participants in the posi-
tive mood condition played with a pen significantly more when
the experimenter played with his pen (M = 2.41) than when the ex-
perimenter didn’t play with his pen (M = 0.93), F(1, 31) = 7.02, p <
.02. No such effect emerged in the negative mood condition (M =
1.47 and M = 1.23, respectively), F(1, 31) = .85, ns (see Figure 1).
GENERAL DISCUSSION
The present research found evidence for the automatic behavioral
consequences of mood. First, in Study 1 we obtained a positive
correlation between mood state and the non–conscious mimicry
of the behavior of others. Study 2 replicated this effect using an ex-
perimental manipulation of mood. To our knowledge, this is the
first evidence for an effect of mood on automatic behavior.
These findings support a functional explanation of the effects of
mood on processing and action. Moods give us information about
the status of our environment and we subsequently adjust our
cognitive processes in a manner that is best suited for the situa-
tion; holistic when we feel good and things are going okay, and
analytic when we feel bad and things are problematic. The pres-
ent research is the first to show that we even adjust our non–con-
scious behavior to the environment. In a good mood, we
automatically take over the behavior of others, whereas in a bad
mood, we are less easily influenced by other people’s behavior.
In addition, it is important to realize that in both studies, the tar-
get person was presented on a TV screen and participants were
alone in the room. There is no logical or strategic reason for partic-
ipants to mimic the behavior of the experimenter. Although
happy moods have been known to foster smooth social interac-
tions (George, 1990), in the present studies, there was no interac-
tion. Participants must have been unaware of their mimicry (see
also Chartrand & Bargh, 1999; Van Baaren et al., 2003; Van Baaren
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et al., in press) and weren’t expecting concrete beneficial conse-
quences of their behavior. The fact that they took over behaviors
from a TV screen is strong support for the idea that mood has con-
sequences on an automatic behavioral level.
A question that needs to be addressed in future research is how
exactly mood moderates mimicry. What processes underlie this
effect? A tentative theoretical explanation may be derived from
recent theories in the domain of self–regulation and behavior reg-
ulation (see, e.g., Kuhl, 2000; Strack & Deutsch 2002). Strack and
Deutsch (2002) proposed a dual system model in which behavior
is either (indirectly) instigated by consciously formed intentions
or by largely unconscious intuitive mechanisms in response to in-
ternal and external cues. Interestingly, Kuhl’s (2000) personality
systems interaction model suggests that positive mood facilitates
the instigation of intuitive behaviors, while negative mood tends
to inhibit such behaviors. Although these theoretical accounts are
fairly recent and to some extent rather tentative in nature, they
would accommodate our present findings. In line with these ap-
proaches, we propose that diffuse affect (positive and negative
mood) serves a regulatory function both with regard to informa-
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FIGURE 1. Amount of pen-playing during pen-playing or control video session in the
positive and negative mood conditions.
tion processing style and behavioral control (see for an extensive
discussion of the model Van Knippenberg, Holland, & Van
Baaren, 2003). With regard to processing style, we propose that
negative mood is conducive of conscious, deliberative informa-
tion processing accompanied by a narrow focus of attention,
while a positive mood fosters an intuitive processing style, ac-
companied by a broad span of attention. Thus, we suggest that
positive mood induces a broad span of attention, and an en-
hanced susceptibility to environmental cues that lay outside the
range of the direct focus of attention. Such environmental cues
may trigger automatic behaviors (e.g., mimicry). Conversely, in a
negative mood the sensitivity for and responsiveness toward
such peripheral environmental cues tend to be reduced and,
hence, behaviors potentially associated with such cues will be
reduced as well (cf. Kuhl, 2000; Van Knippenberg et al., 2003).
Although we have not included specific mediational variables
in our present study, some data gathered at the end of the second
experiment may provide some preliminary evidence concerning
the proposed mediational role of attentional focus. In the room in
which the experiment took place, several irrelevant objects were
present (e.g., clock, video case, woorden puppet). After the exper-
iment, participants were taken to another room in which they did
a surprise memory test (a free recall task and a separate recogni-
tion test) to check whether they remembered the objects in the ex-
perimental room. In an attempt to reconstruct the participants’
attention during the experiment, we computed a “peripheral
memory index” by dividing the total number of objects correctly
remembered by the time needed to complete the memory task.
This index was constructed in order to measure memory, while
controlling for effort (conceptually similar to a correction for
speed–accuracy tradeoff in Reaction Time tasks). As a first step in
the mediation, the effect of mood on the mediator (memory in-
dex) was assessed and results indicated that participants in a pos-
itive mood condition had better memory of peripheral objects (M
= 0.028) than participants in the negative mood condition (M =
0.018), F(1, 31) = 6.90, p < .02. When the effect of mood on mimicry
was controlled for memory, there was no longer a difference in
mimicry between the negative and positive mood condition, F(1,
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28) = 0.87, ns. A Sobel test for mediation indicated that the media-
tion is significant, Sobel’s t = 2.26, p < .03.3
This tentative analysis suggests that the effect of mood on mim-
icry may have been partially mediated by the participant’s
attentional focus. Participants in a positive mood seem to have
processed their surroundings with a broad focus (Friedman,
Fishbach, Förster, & Werth, 2003) including peripheral stimuli
that lay outside the range of directly task–relevant stimuli, while
participants in the negative mood condition seem to have
shielded off such peripheral influences. The finding that process-
ing style influences mimicry is in line with recent research by Van
Baaren et al. (2004) where in three studies, a relation between pro-
cessing style and mimicry was demonstrated. Obviously, more
research is needed to gain insight into the underlying processes
by which mood affects our non–conscious behavior.
Our moods reflect the valence of our environment (Chartrand,
Van Baaren, & Bargh, in press), which subsequently influences
the way in which we perceive and interact with our environment.
When our mood signals safety, we adopt a broad span of atten-
tion and our behavior becomes subject to subtle environmental
influences. Conversely, when our mood signals problems, we
tend to adopt a narrow focus of attention and the influence of pe-
ripheral environmental cues on our behavior will be reduced.
Future studies should be aimed at further understanding the
behavioral consequences of mood and the cognitive and motiva-
tion processes involved. For example, is a positive mood also as-
sociated with greater behavioral priming (Bargh, Chen, &
Burrows, 1996; Dijksterhuis & Van Knippenberg, 1998)? In doing
so, we will learn more about the subtle ways in which we, as hu-
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3. We also performed a mediation analysis using the recognition measure without control-
ling for effort (not divided by the time it took). As a first step in the mediation, the effect of
mood on the mediator (recognition) was assessed and results indicated that participants in a
positive mood condition had better memory of peripheral objects (M = 8.29), than participants
in the negative mood condition (M = 7.38), F(1, 31) = 4.77, p < .04. When the effect of mood on
mimicry was controlled for recognition, there was no longer a significant difference in mim-
icry between the negative and positive mood condition, F(1, 28) = 2.72, p = 11. A Sobel test for
mediation indicated that the mediation was marginally significant, Sobel’s t = 1.69, p = .09.
man beings, react to our environment, which, from an adaptive
point of view, is extremely important for our survival.
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